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Mission Impossible: A Legislative Solution for
Excessive Executive Compensation
ROBERT E. WAGNER
One of the great dilemmas of corporate law is how to address the
problem of excessive executive compensation without replacing it with
excessive government intervention. This Article proposes for the first time
that Article 36(b) of the Investment Company Act (“ICA”), which enacted
fiduciary obligations for investment advisers, be applied to general public
corporations. The effect of this proposal—termed Corporate 36(b)—would
be to impose upon CEOs and other highly placed corporate executives a
fiduciary duty with regard to their compensation packages. This would
enable federal courts to genuinely evaluate the procedural and substantive
nature of executive compensation negotiations. As scholars, the media,
and politicians have pointed out, excessive executive compensation
reduces shareholder wealth, increases hostility in the workplace, and
provokes societal anger. The Article demonstrates that the legislative
history of the ICA supports the application of its principles to general
corporations. It further shows that the courts’ implementation of the ICA
can be replicated in the context of general corporations. The Article
argues that adoption of Corporate 36(b) will help to reduce executive
demands, to empower and incentivize boards of directors, and to avoid
undesirable federal regulation. The Article also addresses potential
criticisms concerning the risk of nuisance suits and strike litigation, the
vagaries of involving courts in business decisions, and the problems
surrounding federalization of corporate law. The Article concludes with a
brief description of how the proposed legislation could have been applied
to deal with the controversial compensation package in the well-known
case of Disney’s hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz.
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Mission Impossible: A Legislative Solution for
Excessive Executive Compensation
ROBERT E. WAGNER
I. INTRODUCTION
After the death of Apple icon Steve Jobs, Tim Cook took the reins of
the company and likely became the highest-paid CEO in America in 2011.1
The Associated Press reported that Cook’s compensation package was
valued at $378 million.2 At approximately the same time, the median
salary for American workers had just fallen to a decade low of $26,364 a
year.3 Given this extreme disparity, there is little mystery as to why
movements like “Occupy Wall Street” have received so much attention
over the last year.4 Many people, including leading scholars and seemingly
almost the entire nation, think that executive compensation in publicly
owned American companies is excessive.5 In 2010, CEOs at a majority of
the S&P 500 companies had an average salary equaling 343 times that of
an average American worker.6 Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) Chairman William Donaldson has stated: “One of the great, asyet-unresolved problems in the country today is executive compensation
and how it is determined.”7 The news is commonly filled with stories of


Visiting Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark; University of Chicago Booth
School of Business, M.B.A.; Cornell Law School, J.D. I would like to thank Adil Haque, Jacqueline
Lipton, Irina Manta, Chrystin Ondersma, Cassandra Robertson, Reid Weisbord, and my research
assistant Jordan Kaplan. I am grateful to the staff of the Rutgers School of Law-Newark for support
during my research.
1
Ryan Nakashima, Apple CEO Tim Cook Could Top Pay List in 2011, YAHOO ! FINANCE (Jan.
10, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/apple-ceo-tim-cook-could-003124192.html.
2
Id. The Article notes that this was a large change for Apple, where in the past, former Apple
CEO Steve Jobs accepted a salary of only one dollar for several years but owned approximately 5.5
million shares in the company, worth about $2.3 billion as of January 2012. Id.
3
David Cay Johnston, First Look at US Pay Data, It’s Awful, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2011, 5:15 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/19/idUS254294359320111019.
4
Id. (“The data show why protests like Occupy Wall Street have so quickly gained momentum
around the country, as people who cannot find work try to focus the federal government on creating
jobs . . . .”).
5
Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1013–14 (2009).
6
Jennifer Liberto, CEOs Earn 343 Times More than Typical Workers, CNNMONEY (Apr. 20,
2011, 7:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/economy/ceo_pay/index.htm.
7
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 189 (2004).
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8

executive compensation.
We are repeatedly encountering stories of
executives prospering while the corporation they head and its employees
are struggling, and we often hear instances of lavish perks given to CEOs
even after they leave their jobs.9 Last year, in the New York Times alone,
there were 268 articles dealing with executive compensation10 and over
10,000 articles appeared in publications across the nation.11 While the
financial crisis that began in September 2008 cannot be blamed solely on
executive compensation, it is related at least indirectly;12 indeed, executive
compensation has been described as a “contributing factor” to the recent
economic crisis by the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner.13 This
Article attempts to address the problem of excessive executive
compensation by proposing the imposition of fiduciary duties on
executives in matters dealing with executive compensation.
Many people are concerned about the seeming unfairness of
disproportionate executive compensation and promote the idea of
governmental regulation to limit these perceived excesses.14 In times of
economic difficulty or scandal, even conservative politicians embrace
increased government control of corporations, and after the Enron and
WorldCom scandals, President Bush praised the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for
containing “the most far reaching reforms of American business practices
since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”15 Politicians feel a strong
need to appear to upset investors that they are “doing something” and
being “aggressive” against possible corporate fraud.16 Furthermore, in the
2008 presidential election, candidates repeatedly used executive
compensation as an issue that signified social inequities and required a

8
Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s Efforts to Regulate
Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 484 (2007).
9
See id. at 485 (describing how ConAgra Foods employees are seeing their bonuses eliminated
while the former Chairman received bonuses, stock options, and a $20 million retirement package, and
how General Electric CEO’s retirement package included a New York City apartment, country club
memberships, use of the corporate jet, and Red Sox tickets).
10
This resulted from a Westlaw search of the New York Times database using the search terms
“ceo or executive w/5 pay or compensation” for the dates between 12/31/2010 and 1/1/2012.
11
This resulted from a Westlaw search of the “ALLNEWS” database using the search terms “ceo
or executive w/5 pay or compensation” for the dates between 12/31/2010 and 1/1/2012.
12
Posner, supra note 5, at 1040–41.
13
Joe Nocera, Geithner’s Plan on Pay Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at B1.
14
See James O’Toole, Occupy Wall Street Reacts to Goldman Sachs Pay, CNNMONEY (Oct. 20,
2011, 2:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/economy/goldman_sachs_occupy_wall_street
/index.htm (relating statements by Amanda Saleen, Stephen Crawn, and Gabriel
Brownsteinindividuals who participated in Occupy Wall Streetwhen asked about Goldman Sachs
setting aside $10 billion for staff pay, including, “I think it’s ridiculous” and “for the future of our
nation there needs to be a change,” and calling for “more strict regulation” of the financial industry).
15
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring
2003, at 26, 28.
16
Id. at 28.

2012]

MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

553

17

regulatory solution.
It was also an issue in the 1992 presidential
campaign,18 and there is no reason to believe that the current election cycle
will be any different. There is a history of major economic government
interventions during times of crisis, including in matters of securities
trading during the Great Depression, corporate takeovers in the 1980s, and
corporate governance following the Enron and WorldCom scandals.19
In a poll performed by Fortune magazine in 1936, most Americans
already thought that executives were paid too much.20 Well before the
current economic crisis, contemporary executive compensation had been
criticized by scholars and the populace alike for decades.21 As pointed out
recently by the Obama Administration’s so-called “pay czar” (appointed to
determine appropriate compensation levels for Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP”) recipients),22 high levels of uncertainty and
unemployment combined with low job security induce society at large to
experience anger when finding out about the high salaries that executives
receive.23 This frustration will most likely eventually translate into
government action.
Some politicians and others have claimed for several decades that the
problem with executive compensation is that executives are accountable to
directors whom they select themselves, rather than to the shareholders
directly.24 Yet, surprisingly very little has been done to give shareholders
the ability to make executives accountable to them. Over time, much of
the thought about executive compensation was based on economic
assumptions that may be flawed. As Judge Posner from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in a recent dissent, this “economic
analysis . . . is ripe for reexamination on the basis of growing indications
that executive compensation in large publicly traded firms often is
excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police
compensation.”25
17
Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 305 (2009).
18
Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses—Again, 41 U.S.F.
L. REV. 147, 148 (2006).
19
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591 (2003).
20
Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture,
Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 858 (2011).
21
See Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive
Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795, 795–96 (1995)
(stating that the issue of excessive compensation is not new).
22
Deborah Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, (June 5,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124416737421887739.html.
23
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Symposium on Executive Compensation Keynote Address, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 349, 351 (2011).
24
Salky, supra note 21, at 800.
25
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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The basic problem is one of agency costs, which arise in situations in
which an agent is hired to do a job that the principal is either unable or
unwilling to do; while the principal wants the agent to do the best job that
he can, he also wants to pay him as little as possible.26 The principal wants
his own and the agent’s interests to coincide, but because the agent is
looking out for himself just as the principal is, the only way to ensure that
the agent will be perfectly faithful to him is if he thoroughly monitors and
gauges the agent’s work and correspondingly adjusts the agent’s
payment.27 Otherwise the agent is likely to “slack off, or divert revenues to
himself, or both.”28 In this context, the task of a board of directors is to
conduct that monitoring, but some individuals have begun to question
whether boards of directors are controlled by long-term CEOs and are
therefore not supplying the necessary oversight.29 In support of this, they
point out that CEOs are not fired that frequently; in fact, only between twopercent to two-and-one-quarter-percent of CEOs at large corporations are
forced out each year,30 a rate that some think is lower than warranted and
that further indicates CEOs’ control over boards.
Given the recurring nature of executive compensation questions,
scholars have claimed that “any regulatory regime that can somehow grant
shareholders more power over compensation decisions . . . is a positive
step toward improving the inherent problems with existing compensation
practices.”31 Executive compensation has been soaring for decades despite
various attempts to stop that trend, ranging from the imposition of
increased tax burdens to mandatory disclosure requirements.32 In fact, the
federal government is already exercising more control than ever over the
relationship between boards and executives, and further regulations are
likely, including possible ones requiring specific amounts of
compensation.33 There has already been some federal regulation of
executive compensation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act,34 which requires that
if a corporation engages in erroneous reporting that results in it later having
to correct its financial statements, then the corporation must have policies
26

Posner, supra note 5, at 1015.
Id.
28
Id.
29
See Charles K. Whitehead, Why Not a CEO Term Limit?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1263, 1271–73
(2011) (arguing that one of the board’s functions is to oversee the CEO, but the CEO actually exercises
control over the board).
30
Id. at 1267.
31
Salky, supra note 21, at 826.
32
See Simmons, supra note 17, at 304 (describing various responses that have failed to address
increasing executive compensation including tax measures, board independence requirements, and
mandated disclosures).
33
See Whitehead, supra note 29, at 1276–77 (describing regulatory control over corporate
governance and noting that “future proposals may include . . . implementing a range of CEO pay
requirements that mandate certain types of compensation.”).
34
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5301 (West 2010).
27
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that enable it to claw back incentive-based pay from executives. Indeed,
there are already many different types of federal and quasi-federal
organizations that affect the internal structure of corporations, such as
Congress itself and agencies like the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and
the SEC, but also quasi-private institutions like the New York Stock
Exchange and others.36
Unfortunately, lawmakers have a tendency to go into “crisis-mode”
and have “knee-jerk” regulatory reform responses in times of economic
turmoil.37 As a result, many of the previous remedies to executive
compensation, such as increased disclosure, which seemed to be
“uncontroversial,”38 not only failed to reduce compensation but arguably
increased it.39 American CEOs are paid, on average, over twice as much as
foreign CEOs, which is at least in part due to the fact that a much larger
percentage of their pay is in the form of stock options;40 this latter state of
affairs arguably resulted from attempting to tie their pay to performance as
the tax law encouraged.41 As Professor Richard A. Epstein has pointed
out, there are always conflicts of interests between the firm’s welfare and
an executive’s welfare, and there are downsides to every compensation
package, which is why he argues that “regulation is such a foolhardy way
to approach the problem.”42
Not only have regulatory attempts to address executive compensation
created problems, but the courts have not provided workable solutions,
either. Traditionally, shareholders have had three options if they were
dissatisfied with the corporation of which they owned a part: selling,
voting, or suing.43 Studies have shown that, while not impossible, it is very
difficult for shareholders in public companies to have much success in

35

Whitehead, supra note 29, at 1276.
Simmons, supra note 17, at 323.
37
Id. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive CEO
Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 461–62 (2007).
39
This increase is apparent (1) in the “ratcheting effects” that are exacerbated by disclosure and
(2) in the increased grants to CEOs of stock options, which is caused partly by the tax changes reducing
deductions for pay not linked to “performance.” See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 71–72
(stating that the vast majority of firms using peer-group information set CEO compensation at or above
the fiftieth percentile of the peer group, leading to an increase in compensation); Simmons, supra note
17, at 346 (explaining that a tax law with the express purpose of containing executive compensation has
resulted in an escalation of pay through stock options).
40
Posner, supra note 5, at 1020–21.
41
Simmons, supra note 17, at 346.
42
Richard A. Epstein, Steering Clear of the Executive Compensation Bog, FORBES, June 16,
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/15/salary-bonus-ceo-opinions-columnists-executivecompensation.html.
43
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise
in Futility, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 569–70 (2001).
36
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compensation lawsuits, with the condition of demand futility imposing
a particularly high burden in these cases.46 In the first pertinent case
decided by the Supreme Court, a somewhat shareholder-friendly rule
seemed to be emerging. The rule was that “[i]f a bonus payment has no
relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in
part and the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate
property against the protest of the minority.”47 Yet, this seemingly
shareholder-friendly approach by the judiciary was short-lived. Courts are
usually reluctant to become involved in corporate executive compensation
issues.48 Many reasons exist for limited judicial intervention on internal
corporate affairs, including the common belief that judges are unable to
determine appropriate compensation packages, the minimal amount of
legislative guidance in the area, and a fear of excessive shareholder
litigation.49
One of the problems with attempting to deal with high executive
compensation is the fact that not everybody agrees that it is a problem at
all. Just because executive compensation is high does not necessarily
mean it is excessive. It could only be accurately described as excessive if
it is above the “correct” price, and determining said price is very difficult.50
There are at least two schools of thought regarding executive
compensation. One could be classified as the adherents of the “optimal
contract” theory, who basically assert that there is nothing wrong with the
current situation and that modification is unnecessary; juxtaposed with the
managerial power theorists, who advocate “sweeping changes to the
current system.”51 The latter argue that a CEO’s only supervisor is the
board of directors, which may be an unreliable agent of the principals (the
shareholders) themselves.52 Some empirical studies have concluded that
CEOs do in fact have significant bargaining power, and the differences
between their contracts and those of other corporate workers “seem quite

44

See id. at 571.
See infra note 161 and supporting text.
46
Thomas & Martin, supra note 43, at 571.
47
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–92 (1933) (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
48
But see Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 848 (explaining that “contrary to received wisdom,
courts have from time to time engaged in serious review of executive compensation practices and pay
packages”).
49
Thomas & Martin, supra note 43, at 572.
50
Hawkins, supra note 38, at 450; see also D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule,
Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 874 (2007) (stating that extraordinarily
generous compensation packages are not necessarily excessive).
51
Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 847–48.
52
Posner, supra note 5, at 1018.
45
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stark.”
It is a fairly common belief that the discretionary power of both
directors and executives in a corporation should be directed toward a single
end, “the maximization of shareholder wealth,”54 but how to achieve that
goal is less clear. Many agree that placing a cap on CEO compensation
would be a mistake.55 Former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox noted in a
speech in 2006 that it is not the government’s role to determine the
appropriate level of executive compensation; rather, it is the shareholders’
and directors’ job “to determine how best to align executive compensation
with corporation performance, to determine the appropriate levels of
executive pay, and to decide on the metrics for determining it.”56 As Judge
Posner has indicated, “The more effective shareholder monitoring is, the
less need there is for incentive-based compensation: the stick is substituted
for the carrot.”57 At the same time, the more complex the tasks are, the
higher the cost of monitoring.58 This Article will delineate a proposal that
reduces these costs by not only increasing the amount of available outside
monitoring but also decreasing the total amount of monitoring needed.
I suggest that the legislature should adopt Section 36(b) of the ICA,
which imposes a fiduciary duty upon investment advisors and investment
companies in relation to advisors’ compensation,59 and should apply it to
CEOs and publicly traded corporations when it comes to CEOs’ and other
executives’ salaries. I call my idea “Corporate 36(b)” and will refer to it as
such in this Article. Corporate 36(b) would subject the compensation
packages of CEOs and other highly placed executives to federal litigation
in the event of egregiously inflated salaries. Adopting a provision that
contains numerous protections for all the parties, and that has received
judicial approval from numerous appellate courts, including most recently
the Supreme Court, will avoid the pitfalls of many other proposals.
I will begin by describing the argument that executive compensation
has been set at artificially high levels for many years (if not for decades
and beyond), and I will focus on the case that Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse
Fried famously made in their book Pay Without Performance: The
53

53
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 266 (2006).
54
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616
(2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
55
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 1045 (“Placing a ceiling on CEO salaries and other
compensation would be a mistake.”).
56
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Chairman’s Opening Statement;
Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm.
57
Posner, supra note 5, at 1023.
58
Id. at 1017.
59
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
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60

Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which has been cited by
over 300 law review articles and cases.61 I will then discuss the counterarguments presented against their thesis and conclude that whether or not
one fully agrees with Bebchuk and Fried, virtually all observers
acknowledge that problems—albeit of varying degrees—exist in the status
quo. I will then discuss the problems with the remedial measures
attempted up to this point, including the failed efforts to correct the
situation through tax reform, disclosure requirements, and shareholder
litigation. I will then present the argument for adopting Corporate 36(b) as
a partial solution to the problems previously identified, and lastly, I will
respond to possible objections to the proposal, including the possibility of
strike suits and the issue of federalizing a part of corporate law.
II. MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS VERSUS OPTIMAL CONTRACT THEORY:
BEBCHUK AND FRIED’S “PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE” AND ITS CRITICS
A. The Argument that Executive Compensation Is Broken
In 2004, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried published a book that
became the basis for many commentaries and criticisms of the corporate
compensation structure; this book will serve as a foundation for my
examination of the potential problems that currently exist with executive
compensation. As Bebchuk and Fried indicated, a surge of corporate
scandals in 2001 led many individuals to examine and question how
executive compensation is determined in U.S. corporations.62 They
concluded that due to the flaws of the compensation system, it was
necessary to make boards not only more independent from executives, but
also more dependent on shareholders.63 They argued that the market
constraints that are supposed to make boards and executives bargain over
the executives’ compensation package in an arm’s-length manner are
insufficient.64 Empirical studies show that executives with more power
receive better packages that are less sensitive to performance than do
similar but weaker executives.65
Bebchuk and Fried denied the claim that receiving these large pay
packages is inherently unfair; rather, they explained that their opposition
comes from a purely pragmatic and consequentialist perspective.66 Indeed,
60

BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7.
This information results from a Westlaw search of the “ALLCASES, TP-ALL, JLR” data set
using “pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation.”
62
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at ix.
63
Id. at x.
64
Id. at 4.
65
Id. at 5.
66
Id. at 8.
61
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there are several deleterious effects that can arise from excessive salaries,
including smaller dividends for shareholders, a reduction of earnings per
share, inefficiencies within the workplace that result in a negative impact
on worker morale, higher turnover, and increased competitiveness among
workers.67 The authors disagreed with the traditional view that “boards,
bargaining at arm’s length with CEOs, negotiate pay arrangements
designed to serve shareholders’ interests.”68 Rather, they pointed out that
being a member of a board of directors has both financial and non-financial
benefits that give strong incentives to board members to maintain their
position.69 These incentives to keep their position are clearly affected by
the fact that the most significant element of staying on a board is being
placed on the company’s nomination slate, which is often controlled
(sometimes even directly) by the CEO.70
Bebchuk points to many incentives on the part of the board to give the
CEO what she wants, including: (1) “[d]irectors are often CEOs of other
companies and naturally think that CEOs should be well paid . . . often
they are picked by the CEO”;71 (2) CEOs can influence the compensation
given to directors;72 (3) many directors have social connections or are even
friends with the CEO;73 (4) there is a desire to foster a collegial atmosphere
because they will have an ongoing working relationship;74 and (5) a
working pattern of respect and possibly acquiescence exists due to the
CEO’s position.75 Even when supposedly external sources are used to
determine compensation, problems persist. For example, firms that
specialize in consulting on these matters, “which provide cover for
generous compensation packages voted by boards of directors, have a
conflict of interest because they are paid not only for their compensation
advice but for other services to the firm . . . for which they are hired by the
officers whose compensation they advised on.”76 In 2005, one outside
consultant, Hewitt Associates, worked for Verizon Communications and
ultimately helped the compensation committee to arrive at a CEO
compensation package worth $19.4 million, a forty-eight percent increase
from the previous year.77 Unfortunately for Verizon, during the same time
67

Simmons, supra note 17, at 335.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 15.
69
Id. at 25.
70
Id. at 25–26.
71
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting).
72
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 30–31.
73
Id. at 31.
74
Charles M. Yablon, Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 89, 108 (2007)
(reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
75
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 32.
76
Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
77
Hawkins, supra note 38, at 488.
68
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period, the value of company stock plummeted by twenty-six percent.78 To
make matters worse, since 1997, this “outside” consultant had earned over
half a billion dollars from consulting services provided to Verizon and
reported to the CEO.79 This does not definitively show that the
compensation package was inappropriate or that anything improper was
done, but it does raise some questions. On the other side of the scale, there
are relatively few incentives for consultants to propose lower
compensation, including a reduction in the value of any stock that the
board may personally have and possible harm to the board’s reputation.80
Bebchuk and Fried are not alone in this observation, as other scholars have
pointed out that executive pay determinations seem to be very one-sided,
with little weighing in on the side of shareholders.81
Furthermore, litigation is a difficult road to travel for disgruntled
shareholders. Since any potential claims are concerned with harm to the
corporation, shareholders have to file a derivative action.82 Generally, a
demand upon the board must precede shareholder litigation, but this is
problematic because boards can use the demand stage to take control and
get lawsuits dismissed. Hence, to successfully file a derivative action,
shareholders must circumvent this demand requirement by raising a
reasonable doubt that the board was disinterested and independent.83 If the
shareholders are able to overcome this large hurdle, the board may still
appoint a special litigation committee comprised of independent directors
that could recommend terminating the suit, and most courts will defer to
this determination.84 If this hurdle is overcome, the shareholders will run
into the business judgment rule, whose consequence is that a court will
refuse to look at the substance of a board’s actions so long as procedural
requirements are met.85 For executive compensation claims, these
procedural requirements are essentially that the board be nominally
independent and informed.86 If the rule applies, a court will not entertain
arguments that the compensation package was unreasonable, and the only
possible claim is that the alleged excessive compensation is corporate
waste.87 To prove waste, a shareholder would have to show that the
package is irrational to such an extent that no reasonable person could
78
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approve it. This task is so nearly impossible and unlikely that it has been
compared to the likelihood of seeing the Loch Ness Monster.89 Waste has
even been described as a “vestige of discarded doctrines,” and
commentators have urged that the doctrine be changed to “allow a majority
shareholder vote to extinguish a waste claim.”90
In addition to these hurdles, there seem to be many factors impacting
CEO compensation that have very little, if anything, to do with
maximizing shareholder wealth or any other measure of corporate benefit.
For example, the compensation received by a CEO is significantly higher if
the chair of the compensation committee was appointed after the CEO.91
But even if we accept the proposition that executive compensation is out of
alignment with the economic interests of corporations, the path to possible
solutions is rocky. Some have interpreted Bebchuk and Fried’s argument
as stating that only “reducing takeover defenses, giving shareholders more
power to change corporate rules, and opening up the nomination process to
facilitate direct shareholder nomination of whole slates of directors” can
begin to correct the flawed executive compensation system.92
Nevertheless, Bebchuk and Fried themselves recognize the fact that
because shareholders are in possession of limited information regarding the
company and are better equipped to help guide the “general contours of
compensation plans,” they should be limited in how much detailed input
they can exercise.93 The scholars further claim that to address what they
see as the problems with executive compensation, we need to “adopt[]
reforms that would confront boards with a different set of incentives and
constraints,”94 and that one way to limit the board’s discretion while still
allowing it to make beneficial decisions would be to require that
shareholders approve certain board decisions.95
Bebchuk and Fried state that the widely dispersed ownership of many
modern corporations, which results in the increased power of the board and
insulation from the shareholders, is not inevitable, but rather “this power is
partly due to the legal rules that insulate management from shareholder
intervention.”96 Bebchuk and Fried further observe that “[c]hanging these
rules would reduce the extent to which boards can stray from shareholder
88
Id. For a general critique of the “reasonable person” standard in the law, see Irina D. Manta,
Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1310–15 (2012).
89
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 46.
90
Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
Whitehead, supra note 29, at 1281.
92
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103
MICH. L. REV 1142, 1159 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
93
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 192.
94
Id. at 189.
95
Id. at 195.
96
Id. at 216.

562

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:549

interests and would much improve corporate governance.”
Before
addressing whether my proposal addresses these concerns, we should first
consider the arguments of individuals who do not believe that the current
system of executive compensation poses problems.
97

B. The Argument that Executive Compensation Is Efficient
There are numerous scholars and professionals who disagree with
Bebchuk and Fried’s managerial power thesis.98 Some have also pointed
out that managerial power is more complicated than Bebchuk and Fried’s
model may indicate in that it involves intricate social interactions in which
the CEO utilizes informational advantages, “personal dynamism,
exploitation of cognitive biases, social norms and fear of disruption of the
status quo” to convince the board of his position.99 While acknowledging
that Bebchuk and Fried have some valid points, other scholars have
indicated that their theory leaves some questions unanswered. For
example, they question why boards are willing to fire poorly performing
CEOs but are still under CEOs’ influence when it comes to pay, why
increased disclosure has not resulted in decreased packages, why new
CEOs get paid more than incumbent CEOs in similar companies,100 and
how it is that salaries go up and down if the theory that managers dominate
their boards is correct.101
On the other side of Bebchuk and Fried’s model of failed corporate
governance in the area of compensation is the position that executives are
in fact paid high salaries appropriately for the great value of the services
that they provide.102 Many practitioners and experts have claimed that
while executives make large salaries, they are not unique in that other
professionals like musicians, actors, athletes, venture capitalists, and
investment bankers also receive very large salaries.103 Other commentators
have stated that there is no problem with excessive compensation and that
the high salaries are in fact warranted due to the size and complexity of
some modern corporations.104 Furthermore, executives help to create jobs
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and investment opportunities for the average investor.
The contrary
position to Bebchuk and Fried’s argument is that pay packages are very
sensitive to corporate performance and that executives typically make
more money when the corporation they run does well.106 Experts have also
pointed out that managerial power theorists claim to be correct not only
when citing to examples where executives prospered while their companies
faltered, but also where executives were making large salaries and the
companies were prospering.107 In the latter cases, these theorists either
choose to ignore the success of the companies or acknowledge it but still
argue that the large salaries result from managerial power. Those who
adhere to optimal contract theory, however, believe that if the corporation
is prospering, then the executive is doing his job and his high salary is
justified. In the last ten to fifteen years, while it is true that CEO
compensation has risen faster than inflation and average employee pay,
“[i]t has not risen faster than the broad stock market and individual
company share prices,”108 and “[s]ome economists believe that the way the
United States pays its executives is a major source of competitive
advantage and that we reject it at our peril.”109
Further, commentators have argued that the salaries are appropriate
notwithstanding their magnitude because the markets where CEOs are paid
less have not performed as well as the U.S. markets.110 Such salaries also
enable optimal management practices, which lead to better survival of the
company in bad economic times and allow it to pull out of problems more
quickly than other companies, which saves jobs.111
Even more
commentators argue that the dramatic increase in CEO compensation is
understandable when one looks at the corresponding dramatic increase in
the asset value of the corporations in question.112 As pointed out
previously, just because a salary is high, that does not necessarily make it
excessive.113 One reason for high salaries is that boards think that having
their respective CEOs in the top half of the salaries of executives makes
them look strong.114 Obviously, if everybody wants to be in the top fifty
percent, that top will continue to get higher and higher every year.115
Commentators have stated that even though high levels of pay may
105
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have “allowed U.S. corporations to attract and motivate perhaps the
greatest managerial generation in economic history,”116 it is also the case
that “[s]ince the advent of the modern corporation, executive pay has been
vilified by the media, targeted for reform by activists, and regulated by the
government.”117 Some have argued that one rarely hears about the evils of
high executive compensation when things are going well, but when there is
a downturn in the economy, activist shareholders and politicians complain
about “corporate greed run amok.”118 Regulators also try to achieve
increased government control during economic and stock market declines,
but then slow these efforts once recoveries take place.119
Some commentators hold the position that since the corporate
governance system of the United States has essentially worked well, we
should be leery of any significant changes to the balance of power between
boards and shareholders.120 This again bolsters my proposal of a modest
improvement that targets the outliers with a tested method unlikely to
cause dramatic negative consequences. Even optimal contract theorists
admit that outliers exist where executive pay packages are too large and in
fact reward mediocre or even poor performance.121 Furthermore, even the
commentators who think that courts should have a minimal role in internal
corporate governance believe that it would be appropriate for courts to act
in outlier or extreme cases.122 Finally, whether there is a problem with
executive compensation or not, the perception of a problem seems to
persist, which creates a possible issue in and of itself. As a former SEC
chairman stated, “the restoration of public confidence in our markets is
fundamental to ensuring that we retain the primacy of America as the
foremost capital market in the world.”123 History, however, is full of
lessons of how government regulation of business—in particular executive
compensation—can backfire. With this in mind, I turn to the next section
in which I discuss some of the failed attempts to address the question of
executive compensation.
C. Past Attempts to Regulate Executive Compensation
One basic reason to avoid government action in setting pay packages is
116
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that it is basically impossible for the government to evaluate the specific
value of a particular CEO at a particular firm during a particular moment in
time. For example, if a firm sees an outgoing CEO as a failure, his salary
could be reduced to one dollar and the firm still would not want to keep
him (even if he looks good “on paper”), but conversely, an incoming CEO
may be able to negotiate a salary that seems exorbitant from the outside
and yet, to the shareholders who view him as capable of fixing a sinking
ship, it may feel like a bargain.124 Given this state of affairs, many would
argue that the government should not take on the endeavor of setting CEO
salaries. In fact, the legislature has shown some reluctance until now to
impose caps on payment and in other contexts has explicitly declined to do
so when it avoided introducing rate regulation or authorizing courts to
second-guess directors in the area of management fees.125 As Professor
Epstein has argued, every business “operates in its own distinctive
environment in which compensation formulas have to interact with the
patterns of shareholder control, the type of direct regulation in place and
the rapid movement in product markets.”126 At the same time, even with
the generally acknowledged limitations of government intervention in this
arena, the government has tried to indirectly influence executive
compensation in myriad ways.
In recent years, many attempts have been made to slow executive
compensation, to seemingly little avail. For example, President Clinton led
the effort to change IRS regulations to define individual employee
compensation of over one million dollars as excessive and not deductible
by corporations.127 The impact of this attempt was a threefold increase in
executive compensation in the following eight years128 because of the way
that the change was structured. Indeed, in 1993, the IRS implemented
Section 162(m), which limited tax deductions for executive pay over one
million dollars; a significant exception to the law, however, was the fact
that pay linked to performance remained deductible.129 The primary effect
was a substantial shift by corporations to increase the amount of anything
resembling “performance-based” stock options as opposed to flat salaries,
potentially contributing to the increase in executive compensation.130
Furthermore, in circumstances where the government tried to reduce the
attractiveness of practices like golden parachutes by imposing higher taxes
on them, some corporations increased the amount of compensation to
124
125
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131

offset the increased tax burden.
Commentators have noticed that when
the government has tried to limit corporate payment plans, corporations
have generally found a way around the limitations through alternative
means,132 which has usually resulted in the shareholders paying even more
than they had before the government intervened.
Another legislative attempt to control executive compensation
originated many decades ago in the form of disclosure obligations.133 In
fact, the SEC has been dealing with disclosure of executive compensation
for the last seventy years, and in 2006, it adopted even more extensive
compensation disclosure requirements.134 Scholars have claimed that
social pressure applied to executives would be sufficient to limit excessive
compensation and therefore all we really need is effective disclosure
requirements.135 Yet, given the so-called ratcheting effect, this does not
seem like a viable solution. The ratcheting effect is due to the fact that “a
third of companies want their CEO’s pay package to be in the top 25%,
and no company wants to pay their CEO below the industry average.”136
Consequently, disclosure actually results in higher executive salaries since
effectively “an increase for one will create increases for all.”137 As
scholars have pointed out, the SEC’s expanded disclosure requirements
made detailed comparisons of CEO pay packages possible and exacerbated
the ratcheting effect.138 There is also some evidence that people feel
empowered to take even more advantage of a situation once their conflicts
of interest have been revealed,139 so disclosure requirements can further
increase the likelihood that a CEO will ask for a very high salary.
Some commentators have also suggested that since shareholders do not
have much recourse after they are informed of large compensation
packages, disclosure is unlikely to have strong effects.140 Even more
131
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recently, through the Dodd-Frank Act, public corporations are now
required to give their shareholders a vote to either approve or disapprove
pay packages given to specific executives,141 which is also known as “say
on pay” legislation. This vote, however, neither binds the corporation nor
implies any additional duties.142 Some scholars have commented that at
least in some contexts, the “say on pay” requirements will make directors
more attentive and could deter some of the more egregious abuses of
executive compensation.143 Nonetheless, given the failures of the previous
disclosure regulations, I am dubious that any significant success will result.
A number of experts have called for more significant substantive
regulation from the government in the form of a greater role for the SEC.144
The possibility of the SEC becoming more involved with corporate
governance is not new. It dates back over seventy-five years, to at least the
time of Justice William O. Douglas, who advocated for increased SEC
regulation of corporate affairs.145 Furthermore, as previously mentioned,146
the possibility of federal intervention in corporate law becomes important
in times “when systemic change is seen as generating a significant populist
payoff,”147 which may currently be the case. At the same time, increased
substantive regulation does have large difficulties even beyond its potential
undesirability, ranging from the extensive study required to adequately
design it to the increased costs for implementation and monitoring.148
Another worry associated with increased regulation is that enhancing the
SEC’s powers is potentially problematic due to the agency’s tendency to
further expand its jurisdiction in times of economic crises or scandal. 149
Even a former chairman of the SEC has stated that it is not the
government’s role, but rather the role of shareholders and the board of
directors to determine how much an executive should be paid.150 Given
these limits of legislation and agency regulation, it is important to
understand the function of the court system in the area of executive
compensation.
141
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Many commentators have argued that if courts would even
occasionally hold boards liable and review compensation awards, this
would encourage directors (and their legal advisers) to bargain more
forcefully with executives, incentivize directors to request more defensible
initial packages, and ultimately reduce the packages themselves.151
Furthermore, the traditional argument that courts lack the ability to
influence executive compensation is at least partially countered by the
courts’ known ability to evaluate pay in the context of insolvent
corporations, closed corporations, and partnerships.152 As I will delineate
in the next section, however, there are limitations to having courts address
the problem of executive compensation.
D. The Court System and Executive Compensation
As described previously, the hurdles encountered by prospective
litigants in the current system are numerous and include overcoming both a
demand requirement and the business judgment rule and/or attempting to
establish a waste claim.153 All of these obstacles are potentially fatal on
their own and, collectively, they spell almost-certain death for prospective
litigation.
The demand requirement is the condition in a derivative lawsuit that a
plaintiff shareholder must first demand that the board of directors take
action before she is allowed to start litigation.154 The plaintiff must show
that demand was “futile” by showing that either the board was not
disinterested or that it did not exercise proper business judgment in the
making of the decision.155 The demand requirement exists for very
legitimate reasons. As the Supreme Court of Delaware has stated, “A
cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs
of the corporation.”156 Frequent investor involvement in corporate affairs
is not the model under which the U.S. corporation has thrived and could in
fact lead to disruption in “the very mechanism that makes the public
corporation practicable—namely, the vesting of authoritative control in the
board of directors.”157 In light of the intended limited role of shareholders,
“the demand requirement . . . exists at the threshold, first to insure that a
151
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stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a
safeguard against strike suits.”158 In Aronson v. Lewis,159 the court held
that the fact that a self-interested individual selected the directors was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of independence.160 In the context
of demand futility, under the test in Aronson, it is virtually impossible for a
plaintiff to make a showing sufficient to litigate the question of
compensation in a publicly held corporation.161
Even if she meets the demand requirement, a potential plaintiff would
face the business judgment rule. Pursuant to the business judgment rule,
courts will generally defer to decisions made by boards of directors in
relation to executive compensation.162 The business judgment rule is often
invoked in the executive compensation context.163 In Brehm v. Eisner,164
the Supreme Court of Delaware stated: “It is the essence of business
judgment for a board to determine if a particular individual warrants large
amounts of money, whether in the form of current salary or severance
provisions.”165 Delaware’s application of the business judgment rule to
executive compensation has established that “irrationality” is the outer
bound of the evaluation and, hence, no more detailed evaluation of the
directors’ decision is to be conducted.166 The essential questions are
whether the board committed “waste” in its decision making and whether it
acted “in good faith”; specifically, this is a “process” evaluation only, and
the precise substantive outcome is not relevant.167
Therefore, potential litigants in executive compensation contexts are
left with the option of attempting to prove “waste.” The Supreme Court of
New Jersey recently reaffirmed the high threshold imposed by the waste
requirement. In Seidman v. Clifton Savings Bank,168 the court stated that
“to prove waste, plaintiff must show that compensation is so one sided that
158
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no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration.”169 The court repeatedly
referred to the idea that for a compensation package to be classified as
waste, it had to be totally without value to the corporation and essentially
equivalent to a gift.170 The court further pointed to other decisions in
which both New Jersey and Delaware courts had decided that to establish
waste, a plaintiff had to show that “an expense served absolutely no
corporate benefit whatsoever.”171 An earlier opinion from Delaware stated:
“The standard for a waste claim is high and the test is ‘extreme [and] very
rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff.’”172 As an example of how
difficult this standard can be to meet, in Seidman, the court held that even
though the directors that had testified could not explain their actions, and
even though they awarded themselves the maximum amount available,
they were still not liable for waste.173 Specifically, the court stated that
although the plans appeared unreasonable to the plaintiffs, there was a
basis for them and they were “not so far outside the norm as to require this
Court to step in and modify them.”174 Ultimately, the position was upheld
that a court had to be persuaded “that no person of sound business
judgment would have found that the benefits conferred were completely
unreasonable based on the services performed.”175 Essentially, where the
payment was made in a rational attempt to acquire or keep a talented
executive, there would be no waste.176 This is clearly a very high hurdle.
The U.S. Senate has even pointed out in similar settings that “the standard
of corporate waste was unduly restrictive.”177
Scholars have commented that going back over a century, courts have
almost never overturned board decisions regarding executive
compensation178 even though there would have been some advantages to
doing so. For example, while the business judgment rule should be used
“when the prospect of litigation genuinely threatens the wellbeing of the
corporation,” it sometimes effectively “prevents shareholder derivative
169
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suits from serving their purpose as a check on management.” 179
Furthermore, when there are conflicts between a board of directors and
managers, even though legally the board should always prevail, practically
it often does so only in response to outside pressures like shareholder
derivative suits.180 Finally, the facts that litigation is expensive and that
shareholder derivative litigation is especially expensive 181 should be used
to tailor any such litigation to maximize its benefits rather than eliminate it
altogether.
III. CORPORATE 36(B): A NEW PROPOSAL TO LIMIT EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
A. Adopting the Lessons from the Investment Company Act to Fashion a
Remedy for Executive Compensation
When the question is asked of who decides corporate questions, there
is no doubt that the answer should be the “the board of directors.”182
Nevertheless, that does not mean that shareholders should never be able to
influence decisions. Bebchuk and Fried point out that “[i]ndependence,
even coupled with incentive schemes, cannot secure shareholder interests
unless there is some mechanism at the end of the chain that makes the
designers of incentive schemes . . . accountable to shareholders,”183 and
“the most effective way to improve board performance is to increase the
power of shareholders vis-à-vis directors.”184 Fortunately, there is already
a mechanism that would begin to accomplish this goal without disruptive
changes and that has been tested for over three decades. Section 36(b) of
the ICA as amended in 1970185 could provide a key tool in addressing the
issue of executive compensation.
Congress should adopt legislation regarding executive compensation
packages in public corporations that is similar to and incorporates the court
decisions dealing with Section 36(b) of the ICA as amended. As
mentioned, this new legislation would be referred to as Corporate 36(b).
The proposed language—with alterations incorporating my proposal—
reads as follows:
The [CEO and top five officers]186 of a [publicly traded
corporation] shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with
179
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respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such [corporation], or
by the security holders thereof, to such [CEO or officers] or
any affiliated person of such [CEO or officers]. An action
may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or
by a security holder of such [corporation] on behalf of such
[corporation], against such [CEO or officer], or any affiliated
person of such [CEO or officer], or any other person
enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a
fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments,
for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation
or payments paid by such [corporation] or by the security
holders thereof to such [CEO or officer] or person. With
respect to any such action the following provisions shall
apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any
defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of
directors of such [corporation] of such compensation or
payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for
such compensation or payments, and ratification or approval
of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other
arrangements providing for such compensation or payments,
by the shareholders of such [corporation], shall be given such
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all
the circumstances.
(3) No such action shall be brought or maintained
against any person other than the recipient of such
compensation or payments, and no damages or other relief
shall be granted against any person other than the recipient of
such compensation or payments. No award of damages shall
be recoverable for any period prior to one year before the
action was instituted. Any award of damages against such
recipient shall be limited to the actual damages resulting
from the breach of fiduciary duty and shall in no event
exceed the amount of compensation or payments received
from such [corporation], or the security holders thereof, by
such recipient.187
The purposes behind the ICA can be useful to see how they fit with the
187

Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
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context of public corporation executive compensation. These purposes
were discussed in the legislative history of the ICA:
1. What is intended: (a) That the investment adviser is
entitled to make a profit.
2. What is not intended: (a) That a cost-plus type of
contract is required[;] (b) That general concepts of rate
regulation as applies to public utilities are to be introduced[;]
(c) That the standard of “corporate waste” is to be applied[;]
(d) That management fees should be tested on whether they
are “reasonable”[;] (e) That a congressional finding has been
made that the present industry level or that the fee of any
particular adviser is too high[;] (f) That the Court is
authorized to substitute its business judgment for that of the
directors[;] (g) That the responsibility for management is to
be shifted from directors to the judiciary[;] (h) That
economies of scale are necessarily applicable at every stage
of growth of the Fund.
3. The test of fairness is to be made by the Court, in
part: (a) By reference to industry practice[;] (b) By reference
to industry level of management fees.
4. The Court shall determine whether[:] (c) The
attention of directors was fixed on their responsibilities[;] (d)
The directors requested and obtained information reasonably
necessary to evaluate the terms of the management
contract[;] (e) The directors having the primary responsibility
for looking after the best interests of the Fund’s shareholders,
have evaluated such information accordingly.188
In sum, “Section 36(b) represents a political compromise of a highly
emotional nature which eschews rate regulation for personal services but
nonetheless caps compensation at market acceptability accompanied by
good faith and fair disclosure of that range.”189
A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the validity of this application of
the ICA as it relates to executive compensation of mutual fund advisors. 190
Scholars have suggested that to affect executive compensation, either the
federal government or states should act to empower shareholders to take
action when necessary.191 This proposed legislation would accomplish that
188
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1422, (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff’d, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
189
Id.
190
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430 (2010).
191
See Jennifer S. Martin, supra note 8, at 534.
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objective while guarding against the dangers of illegitimate strike suits and
other dangers arising from the self-interests of the parties involved.
In addition to the pre-existing requirement that a board be independent,
Section 36(b) provides an extra requirement to ensure that boards will
conduct arm’s-length bargaining, namely the obligation that an
“investment advisor assume the status of a fiduciary of the fund and its
investors with respect to compensation received for its services.” 192
Nonetheless, the burden established by Section 36(b) and the cases
interpreting it is not very high when one considers the fact that since the
law was implemented in 1970, there have been over one hundred cases
claiming a breach of the fiduciary duty but not a single plaintiff has won;
thus, no court has ever held that a mutual fund advisor has breached his
fiduciary duty.193 This does not mean, however, that Section 36(b) serves
no purpose. The existence of the possible litigation could prevent truly
egregious instances from occurring. The law could also help directors
keep investment advisor wages down by giving them an argument during
negotiations.
Scholars have previously suggested that there would be benefits in
applying fiduciary duties to compensation package analysis, but through
the Delaware state court system.194 While I think that this suggestion is
laudable, it is inferior to my proposal for two reasons. First, due to the
increased public pressure on the federal government to act, Delaware is
unlikely to make a substantial change quickly enough to preempt federal
intervention. Given Delaware’s reluctance to ultimately hold executives or
corporations accountable in compensation cases, the trend on the part of
the State’s courts to move more in the direction of imposing these types of
fiduciary duties is unlikely to prove sufficient. Second, even if Delaware
courts did impose this kind of obligation, that would still not account for
the majority of corporations in the country. While Delaware is
significantly more likely than any other state to serve as the place of
incorporation, a lot of companies are not incorporated there.
B. The Parallels Between Investment Advisers and CEOs
There are differences between a general corporation and a mutual fund,
and one could argue that the relationship between an investment company
and its fund manager, as opposed to that between a corporation and its
executive, is different.195 When discussing the relationship between a
192

M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010).
Id.
194
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 849–50 (“With Delaware’s new emphasis on officers’
fiduciary duties, courts can and should assume such a role [of imposing heightened scrutiny on
executive pay] again.”).
195
As the Supreme Court observed:
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mutual fund and its investment adviser, one court has stated: “[T]he fund
often cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.
Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual
fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the
American economy.”196 The investment adviser context is, however, not
the only type of relationship in which arm’s-length bargaining can break
down.197 Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
argued: “Things work the same way for business corporations, which
though not trusts are managed by persons who owe fiduciary duties of
loyalty to investors . . . . Publicly traded corporations use the same basic
procedures as mutual funds: a committee of independent directors sets the
top managers’ compensation.”198 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
recognized the similarities between investment companies and
corporations. Specifically, with respect to their shared origins, the Court
emphasized that investment companies and corporations alike are
incorporated under state rather than federal law.199
The ICA was created to protect shareholders from significant conflicts
of interest.200 Some of these protections increased the similarities between
a mutual fund and a corporation. For example, one of the ways in which
the ICA attempts to achieve its goal is through the requirement that “no
more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors could be affiliated with the
adviser.”201 Publicly traded corporations have a similar requirement for
director independence.202 Section 36(b) in the ICA was originally drafted
because of public concern regarding fees charged in a specific type of
investment fund and was applied to other types of funds203 due to the

Unlike most corporations, an investment company is typically created and managed
by a pre-existing external organization known as an investment adviser. Because
the adviser generally supervises the daily operation of the fund and often selects
affiliated persons to serve on the company’s board of directors, the relationship
between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts of
interest.
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
196
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197
See supra Part II.A.
198
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418
(2010).
199
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
200
Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422.
201
Id.
202
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES 4 (2003), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf.
203
The two different types of funds are the closed-ended and open-ended fund. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals described the difference:
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similar possibility of abuse of the fiduciary relationship in matters of
fees.204 This same potential for abuse exists in public corporations.
Therefore, even though there are important distinctions between typical
corporations and mutual funds,205 the similarities when it comes to matters
of compensation are striking.
If we focus on the problem—i.e., potential excessive compensation
caused by conflicts of interest as opposed to the distinctions in the forms of
the entities—it is easy to recognize the similarities. Experts commonly
accept that the concern regarding conflicts of interest in the mutual fund
industry is what led Congress to the “large-scale federalization” of that
industry in 1940.206 The basic conflict at issue in both public corporate
settings and investment fund adviser settings is a conflict between those
wishing to sell at the highest price (here, employees wanting high
compensation) and those wishing to buy at the lowest price (here,
employers wanting to keep pay low). This conflict is usually settled in a
“market economy by ensuring that competition prevails.”207 As previously
mentioned, however, this approach may not work optimally in the
executive compensation setting.208 In the ICA context, the Supreme Court
pointed out that “Congress added § 36(b) to the [Act] in 1970 because it
concluded that the shareholders should not have to rely solely on the fund’s
directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased
disinterestedness of the board.”209 The intention behind the provision was
to correct a market failure, and a similar instrument could fulfill that
function for CEOs.
When Congress originally passed Section 36(b) of the ICA, it was not

A closed-end investment company, unlike a traditional open-end mutual fund, has
fixed capitalization and may sell only the number of shares of its own stock as
originally authorized. It does not redeem its securities at the option of the
shareholder. Shares of a closed-end fund are traded on a secondary market; that is,
its stock, like that of any publicly owned corporation, is usually listed on a national
exchange. The most pertinent difference between open- and closed-end investment
companies is that closed-end funds are authorized under the ICA to use leverage to
increase the stream of current income through the sale of preferred stock so long as
there is 200% asset coverage for these securities.
Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 740 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002).
204
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1982) superseded in
part by statute, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,689, 52,691 (Oct. 19, 1994) (requiring separate categorization of
management fees, distribution fees, and other fees).
205
See Langevoort, supra note 139, at 1031 (discussing the differences between mutual funds and
corporations).
206
Id. at 1020.
207
John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence
and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 158–59 (2007).
208
See supra Part II.A.
209
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1428 (2010) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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trying to “fundamentally revise the system itself,” but rather to “diminish
the risk of adviser self-dealing.”210 Congress was attempting to provide a
federal remedy that was significantly narrower than common law fiduciary
duty doctrines.211 In the 1970s, a study commissioned by the SEC
identified problems with the independence of investment company boards
and the compensation being paid to advisers.212 In an attempt to correct
these perceived problems, Congress amended the ICA, primarily by adding
two shareholder protections.213 The first attempted to require more
independence from the directors and impose additional responsibilities
upon them.214 Some of these additional responsibilities include an annual
review of advisers’ compensation and require that a majority of the
directors must approve of the compensation.215 The second amendment
designed to protect shareholders was a requirement that advisers be subject
to a “fiduciary duty” in relation to their compensation and gave individual
investors a right of action in case of breach of that duty.216 Similar to
public corporations today, before the 1970 amendments, shareholders in
investment companies had a very limited set of options: “[S]hareholders
challenging investment adviser fees under state law were required to meet
common-law standards of corporate waste, under which an unreasonable or
unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’
or ‘shocking.’”217 To address the problems surrounding investment
advisers, Congress had to craft a delicate compromise between the SEC’s
proposal that shareholders be empowered to bring actions against fees they
deemed “unreasonable” and the industry’s fear that this type of statute
would effectively give the commission ratemaking authority.218 The
Supreme Court pointed out that the final “fiduciary duty” standard enacted
was somewhere in between the two; it was more favorable than the
previous remedies for the shareholders (i.e., waste-based litigation), but it
did not permit courts to determine if a rate was “reasonable.”219
In Jones v. Harris Associates,220 the Supreme Court explained that
something of a consensus had developed over the previous twenty-five
years between the SEC, many federal courts, and scholarly commentators,
all who supported the analysis in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
210
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212
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221

Management, Inc. The previous decisions pointed out that Congress had
not made it clear what was meant by “fiduciary duty,” but they still
established a basic test to be employed in the determination. The Court
stated: “[T]he test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a
charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’slength in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.”222 The Second
Circuit continued by explaining that to be guilty of violating this provision,
“the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could
not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining”223 and that when
courts made this determination, all pertinent factors had to be taken into
account.224 The Court pointed out in other contexts how fiduciary duty
principles are appropriately used across different sets of circumstances.225
Whether it is in a bankruptcy proceeding, investment advisor compensation
context, or as I propose in a public corporation executive compensation
situation, the standard should be the same. As the Court stated, “The
essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the
transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain. If it does not,
equity will set it aside.”226 It should be noted that some commentators
have argued that an arm’s-length bargain is a theoretical construct made
impossible in practice by frictions like contracting and transaction costs,
and that such a bargain is therefore an inappropriate benchmark.227 One
could, however, have an “optimal” or “efficient” contract that maximizes
the net expected value after transaction costs or “frictions” are taken into
account.228 Using these criteria, some defend the current U.S. corporate
structure as possibly the best in light of various costs, including those
imposed by the U.S. legal and regulatory system.229 Nonetheless, this does
not preclude the possibility that the system could be made more efficient
with changes to the legal or regulatory structure.230

221
Id. at 1425; see also Jones v. Harris, 537 F.3d 728, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (noting a “slew of positive citations” to Gartenberg).
222
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1426 (agreeing with Gartenberg’s interpretation of “fiduciary duty” under § 36(b)).
223
Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
224
Id. at 929.
225
See Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427 (explaining how fiduciary duty principles apply in bankruptcy
and trusts).
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Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939)).
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Core et al., supra note 92, at 1159.
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Id. at 1160.
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The ICA was clarified in 1982 in Gartenberg, whose reasoning was
then upheld by the Supreme Court in Jones. Many of the factors that the
Gartenberg court held should be applied to investment fund advisers231 can
be directly applied to all public corporations. For example, factors that
should be taken into account include the nature and quality of the services
provided, comparative fee structures of other executives, and the
independence, expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in
evaluating adviser compensation. The Gartenberg court made it clear that,
in accordance with the legislative history of the ICA, the “fiduciary duty”
obligation is not to be equated with an evaluation of the “reasonableness”
of the fee.232 In fact, the Gartenberg court pointed out that the Senate
report explicitly stated that the court is not authorized “to substitute its
business judgment for that of a mutual fund’s board of directors in the area
of management fees.”233 The shift from demanding “reasonable” behavior
to imposing a “fiduciary duty” seems to have been relatively small, with
the main distinction being a focus on the conduct of the investment adviser
as opposed to that of the fund directors, which resulted in the ultimate test
of “whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what
would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all the
surrounding circumstances.”234 In the analogous situation of a public
corporation, that would mean an increased focus on the executive who is to
receive the compensation, as well as on the board that is giving it to him.
Most litigation to date has focused on the breach of duty by the board; the
occasional claims that have been brought against the executive have been
even more expeditiously dismissed than the ill-fated suits against the
board.235
Finally, the Jones Court asserted that in evaluating a board’s
determination of an executive compensation award, a court needs to
consider both procedural and substantive considerations.236 The Court
went on to say, “[w]here a board’s process for negotiating and reviewing
231
These factors include: (1) the nature and quality of the services provided to the fund and
shareholders; (2) the profitability of the fund to the adviser; (3) any “fall-out financial benefits,”—those
collateral benefits that accrue to the adviser because of her relationship with the mutual fund; (4)
comparative fee structure (meaning a comparison of the fees with those paid by similar funds); and (5)
the independence, expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in evaluating adviser
compensation. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929–32 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010) (citing three of the Gartenberg factors).
232
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investment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should afford
commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining process.”237
This is not to say that a well-deliberated compensation plan is
automatically acceptable. As the Court indicated, even a board in
possession of all the relevant information may award an excessive fee, “but
such a determination must be based on evidence that the fee is so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length
bargaining.”238 The ‘“so disproportionately large’ standard reflects this
congressional choice to rely largely upon independent director ‘watchdogs’
to protect shareholders interests.”239 Thus, there is still supposed to be a
recognition that the board of directors is responsible for the decisions of
the corporation and that shareholders are only able to step in via the courts
when the board is clearly not doing its job. On the other hand, if the
procedures used by the board were deficient or if significant pieces of
information were withheld, then the court should look more thoroughly at
the results.240 This establishes a sliding scale where the more thorough a
decision is, the more credibility it is given, while an evaluation of the
substance of the decision still takes place. This evaluation is intended to
take into account all of the pertinent information,241 even if the information
itself is flawed. For example, as I alluded to previously, one of the
problems with recent attempts to lower executive compensation is the issue
of ratcheting up salaries.242 This can make using other corporations as
examples in the context of appropriate salaries a less-than-trustworthy
measure. The Second Circuit indicated a similar problem in the investment
fund industry when it explained that using other compensation plans as
benchmarks may not be helpful due to the fact that competition could be
virtually nonexistent.243
Given the ratcheting effect, while more
competition may exist for public corporations than in the investment
management field, prices below the ever-increasing norm may equally be
near non-existent. It should be noted, however, that even with such an
acknowledged limitation, the Gartenberg court did specify that this factor
can still be “taken into account.”244
With this totality-of-the-circumstances approach, it may seem that
there are few rigid guidelines, which is true and a benefit of the proposal,
but there are some clear rules. For example, the Court has specified that
237

Id.
Id. at 1429–30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239
Id. at 1430 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240
Id.
241
Id. at 1428.
242
Id.
243
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982).
244
Id.
238

2012]

MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

581

“[j]udicial price setting does not accompany fiduciary duties” and that
courts are ill-equipped to make price rate calculations; plus Congress
explicitly rejected this possibility when it refused to adopt a
“reasonableness” standard.246 Furthermore, it is clear that it would not be
necessary to show any attempt to defraud or even allege that a defendant
engaged in personal misconduct.247 In fact, it would not even be enough to
show that a better bargain may have been possible; rather it must be
demonstrated that compensation was paid under an agreement that was
“unfair.”248 This standard may lead some to think that the bar is set too
low and will result in too many judgments against seemingly innocent
defendants, but that has not been the outcome in the investment advisor
setting. The Gartenberg standard has not been overly burdensome on fund
advisers, and the vast majority of litigation in excessive fee cases has been
resolved in favor of the defendants, with a few settlements taking place in
which the defendants agreed to a reduction in their fee agreements. 249
These rules that have been applied to investment fund advisers for over
thirty years could be used for public corporations, but to what result?
What would be gained from implementing this proposal?
245

D. Benefits of Corporate 36(b)
There are three primary benefits to this proposal: (1) lower initial
compensation demands; (2) the empowerment of compensation
committees; and (3) the avoidance of possible preemption by the federal
government.
Holding CEOs to a fiduciary duty will provide not only remedies but
will act as a prophylactic in that it will induce CEOs to request a lower
compensation package in the first place.250 In this case, this prophylactic
purpose will be achieved in two ways. First, executives will be on notice
that they are considered fiduciaries when negotiating their own pay
packages and that they will not be able to approach the situation with the
sole goal of maximizing their personal salary. Obviously, part of their
objective will still be to maximize their compensation, but this will now be
accomplished by having pay packages that are essentially beyond reproach,
such as to avoid not only the loss of some of the pay itself, but also the cost
in time and money of having to go through protracted litigation.
245
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Therefore, the payment that CEOs will seek will be the one that best
balances the cost of potential litigation and the actual pay received. The
second way that the initial compensation demand will be lowered is simply
due to the increased attention that pay packages will receive. Once the
plaintiffs’ bar is aware of this new source of work, some attorneys will
begin to target it. This means that practiced attorneys and their staffs will
constantly be on the lookout for inappropriate pay packages and for
corporations whose shareholders they may be able to represent. Given this
increased and possibly constant scrutiny, executives will have a strong
incentive to request packages that will be unlikely to turn into the source of
litigation, justified or otherwise.
The second advantage of this proposal is to give executive
compensation committees more leverage to resist if the executives are still
requesting exorbitant pay. As things stand now, a committee can point to
the “say on pay” measure and the issue of bad press, but there are no
significant likely consequences and both sides know it. If it were possible
for a lawsuit to be successful, the committee would not only feel
encouraged to resist the executives’ demands to avoid the suit, but would
also have a very plausible argument during negotiations. They could
effectively say, “Mr. Smith, we would love to give you two hundred
million dollars for three months’ work, but doing so would result in a
lawsuit under Corporate 36(b).” Therefore, this proposal will not only
reinforce the incentives of boards to limit executive compensation, but it
will also increase their ability to do so.
The third advantage of this proposal is the decreased possibility of
government usurpation. As previously pointed out, the federal government
is most likely to intervene in corporate governance issues during times of
economic turmoil and scandal.251 The last few years have been some of the
most tumultuous years for the economy since the Great Depression. It
seems likely that the government is going to act, and this proposal allows
executive compensation to be addressed in a more effective way while
leaving matters in the hands of the boards of directors. If the boards fail,
the proposal puts the issue in the hands of the shareholders, who are in the
best position to find a tailored solution.
E. Possible Objections to Corporate 36(b)
Like all legislative proposals, Corporate 36(b) is likely to face
opposition for a variety of reasons. There are several arguments against
involving the courts in the compensation question. Some of them include
the claims that courts are ill-suited to evaluate compensation packages, that
boards and not courts should be addressing this issue, that it may increase
251

See supra Part I.
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252

shareholder litigation, and that it may jeopardize federalism. First, I will
address the federalism concern, which amounts to the argument that
corporate law should be left to the states and that the federal government
should not interfere. Second, I will examine the objection concerning
strike or nuisance suits, i.e., that legislation will open the door for massive
amounts of litigation solely aimed at extorting sums of money from
corporations. Finally, I will respond to the criticism that boards and not
courts should be answering these questions.
Many scholars and commentators believe that state competition has
helped to maximize the value of American corporations and that because
any federal intervention will not have a competitive component, it is
undesirable.253 General incorporation statutes have existed since at least
1811, but before the twentieth century there was no federal corporate law;
rather, all corporate law was local.254 Historically, a belief dominated that
market forces would be a more effective driver of corporate behavior than
legislative intervention and that the desire for corporate charters would
motivate states to implement optimal laws, which would not occur in the
federal legislative process.255 The argument is that we want states to
fashion laws between which corporations and shareholders can choose.
This position has both supporters and detractors. The supporters argue that
this decentralization will promote a race to the top in which states will
produce the best laws to attract companies for incorporation, while
detractors believe that it will cause a race to the bottom because states will
pander to executives who choose where to incorporate.256 These theories
rely on the premise that states compete for corporate charters and that the
only key difference is the direction of the race. Other scholars have
argued, however, that the competition is basically over, which they support
by the observation that of the companies that incorporate outside their
home state, eighty-five percent do so in Delaware.257 Early commentators
trusted the benefits of state corporate law in part based upon the premise
that states would be innovative in their laws, and thus the best solutions
would result when corporations would choose from among them. 258 It
appears, however, that little innovation occurs because most states have
252
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similar laws, with possibly only Delaware serving as an exception.259
After the market crash of 1929, there was recognition of the impact
that corporations could have on the entire country and of the possible need
for federal regulation, a sentiment that resulted in the 1933 Securities Act
and 1934 Securities Exchange Act.260 These laws marked the beginning of
federal regulation of corporations,261 a trend whose final point is yet to be
seen. It may be true that there is officially no federal corporate law, but
there is clearly a vast amount of federal law both targeted at and affecting
corporations, ranging from insider trading laws to disclosure laws and to
regulations regarding accounting.262 In some ways, the federal government
already partially controls executive compensation; for example, under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, particular executive bonuses are subject to forfeiture
under some circumstances.263 Therefore, regardless of whether one thinks
that government control is a welcome trend, the fact remains that federal
usurpation of significant aspects of corporate control has already occurred
in areas such as securities trading, proxy statement and solicitation, and
various types of fiduciary duty breaches prosecuted frequently as part of
10b-5 fraud claims.264
Even if it was an incontrovertible fact that states need not maintain
authority in this domain because they do not truly compete, and even
though the federal government already controls large sections of corporate
governance, further encroachment by the federal government into state
corporate law remains unjustified. The Supreme Court recognized the
desirability of limiting federal intrusion on state law in the area of mutual
funds and deferred to state law when the ICA did not specifically address a
litigated question.265
The Supreme Court has also stated that
“[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds
to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.”266 My proposal tries to minimize the intrusion of the federal
government into state corporate law and to maintain as much control in the
hands of corporations and individual states as possible.
The second objection I will address is the claim that this proposal will
cause a surge in nuisance lawsuits, to the detriment of both corporations
259
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and the judicial system. There are several mechanisms in place to limit
this possibility. Significantly, the original ICA modifies the traditional
formulation of the fiduciary duty such as to require that the plaintiff bear
the burden of proving that “the fee is outside the range that arm’s-length
bargain would produce.”267 This will help to limit the number of strike
suits. Further mechanisms that reduce the number are courts’ explicit
insistence that all factors be taken into account (including all relevant
circumstances of the board’s review), and the use of benchmarking from
other executive compensation packages.268 At the same time, the Court
recognized the difficulty of using comparable executive compensation
plans when it said: “By the same token, courts should not rely too heavily
on comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers.
These comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those
challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s
length.”269 Additionally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
differences in compensation packages alone are insufficient reasons for the
launch of litigation.270
A further disincentive against strike suits is the cap on damages to one
year of an executive’s salary.271 In fact, given the limitations of the
lawsuit, one could argue that the damages of a possible lawsuit are unlikely
to act as a deterrent.272 In this setting, however, the monetary payout is just
one and possibly the smaller of the true deterrent effects because not only
is the litigation process unpleasant and to be avoided, but reputational
harms to both the directors and CEOs are potentially much greater than any
monetary award. The intended result is that threatening reputational
damage increases the potential impact on executives without producing an
equal increase of the incentives for strike suit plaintiffs. The harm to the
reputation only results if the case is successful. Meanwhile, in a typical
strike suit, the way that a corporation calculates whether to settle takes into
account the harm from the process itself. A nuisance plaintiff could
calculate that there is a ten percent chance of prevailing and winning a
judgment of $1,000,000, and the litigation will cost the corporation
$50,000 to defend whether it wins or loses. Therefore, the suit is worth
267
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$150,000 (ten percent of a million + $50,000). If the nuisance plaintiff
offers a settlement for less than $150,000, there are strong incentives for
the corporation to settle. Given that we are looking for legal solutions that
benefit corporations, a law in this situation is only efficient if it benefits the
corporation by more than $150,000. Or, in other words, the value of the
law has to be above $150,000; otherwise, that law is inefficient and would
better be replaced with a different one. In the case of Corporate 36(b), the
defense against a nuisance lawsuit still costs $50,000, but the cost of losing
is low due to the damages cap of one year’s salary combined with the
extremely low likelihood of prevailing (approaching zero) for a true
nuisance lawsuit. Given these facts, the value of the suit is close to
$50,000. Nevertheless, the value of the reputation of the directors and
CEOs is potentially very large to them, but it is not a value on which a
nuisance plaintiff can capitalize as it only kicks in if he wins, which will
not take place. Hence, the value of a lawsuit under Corporate 36(b) is low
for socially undesirable lawsuits (i.e., $50,000 for nuisance suits) but
potentially very large for socially desirable lawsuits where plaintiffs have
legitimate claims. This all makes Corporate 36(b) a valuable and efficient
law.
The possibility of nuisance suits or strike suits was actually considered
by the legislature in connection with the original ICA; at one point, to
further discourage these types of suits, lawmakers even considered raising
the standard of proof that a plaintiff would need to meet a requirement of
“clear and convincing” evidence.273 Ultimately, the legislature determined
this to be unnecessary, possibly because the standard for application of
Section 36(b) is quite high. It is almost as high as requiring the existence
of “waste,” and in fact some commentators have equated the two even
though Congress specified that the standard in Section 36(b) was supposed
to be lower.274 Although no facts have yet resulted in liability for market
fund investment advisers,275 the success of Section 36(b) may lie in the fact
that the lingering possibility of a lawsuit reduces the starting point of the
still very large pay packages of investment advisers. Finally, although the
cost of defending against litigation can be high,276 there is no evidence
about how high or how much cost may be saved by encouraging lower pay
packages in the first place. It is difficult to put a price on the avoidance of
litigation, but it appears that the benefits from the ICA of reducing
investment adviser compensation outweigh that cost.
The final objection that I want to address is the claim that executive
compensation decisions should not be made by the court, but rather by the
273
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boards of directors. One reason for not wanting courts to conduct this type
of evaluation is the complexity of the compensation negotiation, which can
easily involve more than half a dozen different types of benefits, ranging
from a base cash salary to jets and charitable donations.277 Standing alone,
the existence of complexity is not a very compelling argument since, as I
pointed out previously, courts often deal with similarly complex issues in
other contexts.278
A better argument against courts making this
determination was given by Judge Easterbrook when he said that salary,
bonus, and stock options are:
[C]onstrained by competition in several markets—firms that
pay too much to managers have trouble raising money,
because net profits available for distribution to investors are
lower, and these firms also suffer in product markets because
they must charge more and consumers turn elsewhere.
Competitive processes are imperfect but remain superior to a
“just price” system administered by the judiciary. However
weak competition may be at weeding out errors, the judicial
process is worse—for judges can’t be turned out of office or
have their salaries cut if they display poor business
judgment.279
Judge Posner responded to this point when he stated that Judge
Easterbrook’s “economic analysis . . . is ripe for reexamination on the basis
of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly
traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of
directors to police compensation.”280
While addressing Judge Easterbrook’s objection, Judge Posner’s
response does not fully answer the criticism that we prefer for boards to
make these determinations and that effectively “the power to review is the
power to decide. If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we
have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B.” 281 The
argument about boards amounts to saying that we actually want the
authority to remain with A. I agree that the board should be making
determinations within a corporation, and for this reason my proposal is
severely restricted and only the most egregious situations would be
reviewed. The goal of the original ICA and of this proposal is for the
directors to control conflicts of interest.282 Congress wanted the directors
277
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to work as “independent watchdogs” in the contentious relationship
between investment advisers and their employers.283 In light of this,
Section 36(b) specifically instructed courts to give board approval of an
adviser’s compensation “such consideration . . . as is deemed appropriate
under all the circumstances.”284 The two mechanisms for controlling this
conflict were meant to be both independent and mutually reinforcing. 285
This proposal has the same goal.
By allowing shareholders to have the right to file a federal lawsuit,
both the incentive and ability of directors to maintain this “watchdog”
status will be strengthened. The possibility of suits will result in more
attention and immediate action when compensation packages are
particularly egregious. This will cause board members to be even more
mindful of their duties. Furthermore, by having the ability to tell the
executive that they cannot approve a compensation package because they
could be sued will give board members more leverage in negotiations.
Corporate 36(b) recognizes the tension between assisting the board with
the fulfillment of its duties and removing authority from it. The Supreme
Court in Jones agreed with the Second Circuit’s view in Gartenberg of the
importance of the board’s role when the Court stated that “the expertise of
the independent trustees of a fund, whether they are fully informed about
all facts bearing on the [investment adviser’s] service and fee, and the
extent of care and conscientiousness with which they perform their duties”
should all be considered when determining whether the trustees and the
adviser breached their fiduciary duties under Section 36(b).286 This same
analysis would apply under my Corporate 36(b) proposal. Corporate 36(b)
intends for the board of a public corporation to act as a “watchdog” to
ensure that the amount of compensation paid to executives is appropriate
and properly balances an executive’s desire to maximize his income with a
corporation’s desire to minimize its expenses.
After having pointed out the benefits of this proposal in the previous
section and addressing foreseen criticisms in this section, I will now give a
brief description of how Corporate 36(b) could have affected an actual case
that many feel entailed excessive executive compensation.
F. Corporate 36(b) and Michael Ovitz of the Walt Disney Company
In Brehm v. Eisner, one of several cases prompted by the hiring and
firing of Michael Ovitz at The Walt Disney Company, the Delaware
Supreme Court explicitly stated that in matters of executive compensation,
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a board’s decision is entitled to “great deference.”
The court went on to
state: “It is the essence of business judgment for a board to determine if a
particular individual warrant[s] large amounts of money.”288 But what
happened in this case, and would the outcome have been any different if
Corporate 36(b) had already been adopted?
Michael Ovitz and The Walt Disney Company entered into an
employment agreement in August of 1995 that was intended to establish
Ovitz as the President of Disney for a term of at least five years; fourteen
months later, Ovitz was terminated without cause, entitling him to a
severance package worth approximately $130 million.289 Ovitz had been
socially acquainted and professionally familiar with Disney’s CEO
Michael Eisner for almost twenty-five years.290 Eisner had personally
called all of the board members to tell them about Ovitz when the latter
was under employment consideration, and Eisner discussed both his
qualifications and their friendship.291 The chairman of the compensation
committee cautioned that Ovitz’s salary would be above Disney’s CEO’s
and at the top for any corporate officer, that the stock options he would
receive were more generous than the standards routinely authorized at
Disney, and that “corporate America would raise very strong criticism.”292
Ovitz was also given a $7.5 million bonus (which was rescinded later after
“more deliberate consideration”) for the services he performed during
fiscal year 1996—the same services that led to his termination.293 In
September of 1995, the compensation committee met for a total of one
hour to consider, among other things, the terms of Ovitz’s employment,
during which meeting a term sheet was distributed but without a copy of
Ovitz’s employment agreement.294 The shareholders filed a lawsuit
claiming in part “that Ovitz breached his fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to Disney by (i) negotiating for and accepting the NFT (Non-Fault
Termination) severance provisions of the OEA (Ovitz Employment
Agreement), and (ii) negotiating a full NFT payout in connection with his
termination.”295 The Chancellor established on summary judgment that
Ovitz had not breached any fiduciary duty to Disney because he did not
become a fiduciary until he formally started his position on October 1,
1995, and by then the key conditions of the NFT provision had been
negotiated; hence, the Court of Chancery held that Ovitz’s actions before
287
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October 1 were not subject to fiduciary duty obligations.
And once he
was terminated without cause, Ovitz had the contractual right to obtain the
benefits that the OEA specified for this type of termination, which were
benefits negotiated at arm’s length before Ovitz became a fiduciary.297
The court stated that, under Delaware law, neither future nor former
directors owed any fiduciary duties, and so Ovitz could not have breached
fiduciary duties after December 27, 1996.298 The OEA was the richest pay
package ever offered to a corporate officer.299 In response to the claim that
Disney had engaged in waste, the court explained:
To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must
shoulder the burden of proving that the exchange was so one
sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment
could conclude that the corporation has received adequate
consideration. A claim of waste will arise only in the rare,
unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or
give away corporate assets. This onerous standard for waste
is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment
presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be
upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any rational business
purpose.300
Therefore, the Disney case did not amount to waste.301
After the decision was released, commentators said that the Delaware
Supreme Court had effectively stated that while fiduciary duty, good faith,
and waste theories apply in executive compensation situations, in the
majority of cases the court will only make a procedural inquiry into
compensation determinations as opposed to an actual evaluation of the
substance of compensation packages.302 Basically, as long as proper
procedures are observed and the directors act in good faith, liability is at
best a remote possibility.303 But these procedural safeguards do little to
protect shareholders from directors who may use their discretion in favor
of executives.304 There seems to be a common impression that the
payment to Ovitz of $130 million for fourteen months’ work was
excessive, but the Delaware Supreme Court’s refusal to conduct a
substantive rather than procedural inquiry left the shareholders with
296
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305

virtually no opportunity for a remedy.
To potentially make matters
worse, after cases like this one, corporate boards are encouraged to simply
follow the procedural steps delineated by the courts to insulate themselves
from possible liability. This results in a repeated lack of evaluation of the
substance, which may mean that future shareholders would be left without
recourse in cases of excessive executive compensation.306
In the Disney case, the Court pointed out that Ovitz was not a fiduciary
when he negotiated his contract, and therefore the Court would not apply
much judicial scrutiny to those negotiations.307 This is exactly what
adopting Corporate 36(b) would change. Under Corporate 36(b), the
prospective executive would be considered a fiduciary in matters of pay
packages, thereby allowing a court to examine not only the procedural
aspects surrounding compensation but its substantive nature as well. As I
have described at length, the substantive examination will in part depend
on the strength of the procedural steps,308 and since the Disney case was
quite deficient in that area (although not enough to warrant judgment under
the current standards), a court would look at the substance in such a case
with skepticism. This does not necessarily mean that the court would
come to the opposite conclusion and hold the executive liable,309 but at
least that possibility would exist, and the shareholders would have the
opportunity to be heard on the substance of the grievance. As part of a
fiduciary’s obligation in the negotiation, there would be a requirement that
the negotiation committee be informed of all pertinent information,
including any connection that the fiduciary has to those with whom she is
negotiating and any other information that may undermine the process. 310
This obligation would be carried over to outside prospects if Corporate
36(b) applied to them. This would give the compensation committee both
the necessary incentive and relevant information to uphold its duty to the
shareholders and ensure a reasonable value for the agreed-upon payment
package.
In conclusion, as Charles Yablon and other scholars have pointed out,
“most legal regulation of corporate behavior does not take place in court,
but in the lawyers’ offices, as corporate lawyers counsel their clients as to
what they must do to avoid legal ‘problems’ in connection with the actions
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they want to take.”
If Corporate 36(b) had been in place at the time of
the Disney case, the directors likely would have been advised that the
merits of the package were going to be reviewed and they may have
developed a more equitable package.
311

IV. CONCLUSION
The federal government can and will act in regard to the popular
opinion that executive compensation is excessive and a contributing factor
to some of the economic difficulties that the country has endured over the
last few years.312 According to Professor Steven Bainbridge, “No one
seriously doubts that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause,
especially as it is interpreted these days, to create a federal law of
corporations if it chooses.”313 And, as Judge Posner put it: “In the wake of
the financial crisis there is almost certainly going to be some regulation of
executive compensation—it has begun in the form of conditions in the
recent bailouts of insolvent financial firms. The question is not whether,
but how best, to limit executive compensation.”314 That leaves this
unanswered question as to “how.” Professor Epstein explains that while
the current situation is not perfect, direct government intervention in the
area of executive compensation is likely to confuse matters further.315
Additionally, Dean Thomas Cooley of the NYU Stern School of Business
has said: “Congress has gotten into the business of dictating executive pay
now, and they shouldn’t be in that business. What they should be doing is
turning the light on the committees.”316
Corporate 36(b) may be the best alternative available. While the
establishment of excessive compensation as a possible breach of fiduciary
duties may not eliminate the problem (in fact, in many executive contracts,
breaching fiduciary duties is not even listed as grounds for terminating for
cause317) it will achieve many of the goals necessary for a long-term
solution. For example, it has been suggested that “[i]t is the perception of
abuse that will have a much larger effect on businesses than strict
compliance with economic theory”318 and that “[t]here are few, if any,
countervailing incentives to encourage directors to oppose unwarranted
executive compensation.”319 If these two observations are correct,
311
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Corporate 36(b) could have a substantial impact. It will empower “the
courts to overturn outlier compensation agreements produced by
illegitimate managerial power [and thereby] will attack a perceived major
weakness in our corporate governance system.”320 Further, the creation of
viable legal consequences for some decisions made by compensation
committees will force these committees to be more conservative321 and
ultimately save the corporations and hence shareholders money. The
problem of excessive executive compensation will be even more
effectively attacked through a statute passed by the legislature rather than
through a purely court-fashioned remedy. If courts are involved as part of
the process, however, this could prove beneficial as it has in similar
settings in the past. In close corporations, there has been some indication
that increased judicial monitoring has led to improved contracting between
boards and executives, in addition to some success by shareholders
litigating compensation claims.322
Scholars have indicated that it is often easier to say that courts should
pay greater attention to the conduct of directors and executives, but they
have struggled to define what this would mean in practice.323 The solution
that I propose, by contrast, has the following advantages: it has been tested
for over thirty years in the investment adviser context with minimal
negative consequences; it was recently upheld in its application by a
unanimous Supreme Court; it confers the power upon shareholders to bring
lawsuits; it addresses the wide and growing sense of inequity expressed by
the popular media and activist groups such as “Occupy Wall Street”; and it
will likely forestall a general usurpation of compensation decisions by the
federal government. Therefore, Corporation 36(b) should be adopted as
soon as practicable.
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